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The critical problem of cynical irony: meaning what you say and 
ideologies of class and gender 
Abstract 
Critical theorists such as Slavoj Žižek have for some years discussed the ideological 
significance of cynical or ‘blank’ irony in fairly general terms. Less attention has been paid to 
the practical implications of such irony for critical semiotic analysis. With this in mind, this 
paper discusses the problems that sexist and ‘classist’ jokes – specifically jokes about 
‘chavs’ – pose for the critical analyst. On the one hand, they seem to be saying deeply 
ideological things. On the other, their ironic nature means that they evade the claim that they 
are really saying, asserting, meaning anything. Theirs is a kind of blank irony which can be 
identified in all kinds of contemporary semiotic practice and is therefore an important 
phenomenon for critical analysts to get to grips with. The paper attempts to get to grips with 
it by outlining some semiotic clues to blank irony, and, more importantly, by suggesting 
some ways in which we might try to bring a critical perspective to bear in cases of cynical 
irony.  
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1 Introduction 
This article is about the problem that ironic humour poses for specifically critical approaches 
to communication, such as critical linguistics (Fowler 1996), critical discourse analysis (e.g. 
Fairclough 1995) and critical social semiotics (Caldas-Coulthard and van Leeuwen 2003). 
The problem is that on the one hand the critical investigation of people’s semiotic practice 
involves identifying problems in the kinds of things that people say about the world (in 
whatever mode of communication they ‘say’ them). It involves asking normative questions of 
forms of representation, often understood as ideologies or as Discourses. Or at least it 
involves highlighting the contingencies of naturalised or ‘common sense’ ways of talking 
about the world. But, on the other hand, we often encounter practices in which people seem 
to take an ironic, even cynical stance towards the things they say (e.g. Bewes 1997; 
Jameson 1998). They seem to know that what they are saying is ideological, or that it is a 
contingent, historically formed way of talking. And yet they say it anyway (Žižek 1989). They 
may say the kinds of things that invite critique while at the same time raising uncertainties 
about whether they sincerely mean these things. In such cases, it looks like our critique is 
pre-empted, nullified before we begin, and the questions arise: How do we bring a critical 
perspective to bear? Can we bring a critical perspective to bear? 
The specific case that I use to explore this problem is that of ‘chav humour’ in contemporary 
Britain. This is a kind of ironic humour that takes as its object the stereotypical figure of the 
‘chav’.i I will give a slightly more extensive account of the stereotyping of ‘chavs’ below, but, 
at the moment, it is enough to say, first, that it is essentially a contemporary manifestation of 
long-running stereotypes of the ‘undeserving poor’ (Hayward and Yar 2006; Morris 1994), 
and, second, that talk of ‘chavs’, especially in public discourse, is overwhelmingly humorous 
in orientation. This is extreme class stereotyping. But it is also ‘ironic’. Here, for instance, are 
some jokes taken from The Little Book of Chav Jokes (2006a): 
(1) What’s the best way to sober up a chav? 
Stop his benefits 
(2) What’s the best thing a chav can give up for lent? 
Breathing 
(3) What do you call a chavette with two brain cells? 
Pregnant 
It does not take a great deal of interpretative sophistication to see the class stereotyping and 
the sexism in such examples. It is there loud and clear. It is very much the point of the jokes. 
But this ironic obviousness is precisely what causes problems for the critical interpretation. 
To respond to one of these jokes by saying ‘that’s terrible’ or ‘that’s sexist’ is to some extent 
to fail to ‘get it’. Of course it looks sexist. That’s the point. But it’s ironic. But, from a critical 
point of view, we surely still want to be able to say ‘no, that’s sexist’.  
A useful way to cast this problem is to use the familiar distinction between Discourse and 
Genre (following, e.g. Fairclough 2003). As critical researchers, we might wish to critique talk 
of ‘chavs’ in terms of Discourse, that is, in terms of its descriptive or representational 
relationship to the world. We might ask what is being asserted about the world in talk about 
‘chavs’. But, in the case of irony, any straightforward account, or critique, of Discourse is 
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pre-empted by the specifics of Genre, by the kind of thing that is being done. It is by now 
very well established that representing the world is but one of the many things that language 
does (e.g. Austin 1962; Halliday 1978). Not all Genres have equal commitment to Discourse. 
And ironic communication, if we can call it a Genre, is certainly not easily understood in 
terms of clear assertions about the world. (Again, that is its point.) 
As critical researchers, how do we respond to this? On the one hand, if we ignore this ironic 
Genre, then we run the risk of missing the point, failing to not only ‘get’ the joke, but also 
failing to grasp the nature of the linguistic activity that is taking place. Perhaps we even 
commit Austin’s ‘descriptive fallacy’ (1962, 3), by assuming that we can always understand 
communication in terms of straightforward representation. But, on the other, if we accept the 
irony, then we run the risk of ignoring the Discourse, the fact that what is being said is so 
thoroughly ideologically objectionable. To have any critical purchase at all, we need a way 
out of this.  
The paper is structured as follows. I first provide a little more information on the stereotype 
of the ‘chav’ itself. I then discuss what I mean by irony, and contrast the kind of irony 
prevalent in contemporary discourse – which I call, following Jameson (1998), ‘blank’ irony – 
with two other forms of irony, namely ‘sarcasm’ and ‘satire’.ii I then turn my attention to ‘chav’ 
discourse itself and outline those phenomena that lead me to the interpretation that 
discourse on ‘chavs’ actually is ironic in the first place. Finally, I return to the central concern 
of the paper and propose some possible critical responses to this blank irony: (1) we simply 
give up on critique; (2) we ignore the irony and address earnestly what is literally said; (3) we 
focus on the irony as Genre itself. None of these is entirely satisfactory but each, I think, has 
some merit and raises suggestive further questions.  
2 ‘Chavs’ 
The figure of the ‘chav’ came to the fore early in the first decade of the Twenty-First Century 
as a stereotype of working-class, usually young, men and women. The word itself entered 
the Oxford English Dictionary in 2004 defined as ‘a young person of a type characterized by 
brash and loutish behaviour and the wearing of designer-style clothes (esp. sportswear); 
usually with connotations of a low social status’, and announced as Oxford University 
Press’s first ever word of the year. This paper is not intended as a comprehensive account 
of discourse on ‘chavs’ (see e.g. Hayward and Yar 2006; Moran 2006), but there are a few 
points about the ‘chav’ that it will be useful to make at this stage: 
1. ‘Chav’ is a stereotype of other people. It is very rarely used in self-identification. 
Early in Grace Dent’s teen novel Diary of a Chav, our eponymous ‘chav’ writes ‘I 
really hope they stop calling [our school] ‘Superchav Academy’ soon … WE’RE NOT 
ALL CHAVS RIGHT? … Me and Carrie AREN’T anyway. Uma Brunton-Fletcher 
down the road is a bit’ (2007: 4-5). This nicely illustrates a point that can be taken 
from sociological research on young people’s talk about class; ‘chav’ is used by 
youngsters at various social positions to talk about those that they perceive as being 
‘below’ them. It is not used by these young people to identify themselves (e.g. 
Maxwell and Aggleton 2010; Nayak 2006).iii  
2. Aside from the word ‘chav’ itself, there is little new about discourse on ‘chavs’. Much 
of what is said about ‘chavs’ echoes well-established stereotypes of the ‘feckless’ or 
‘undeserving’ poor, or the ‘underclass’. Key features of this representation, as 
outlined by Levitas (2005: 21) are that: ‘[i]t presents the underclass … as culturally 
distinct from the “mainstream”’; ‘[i]t focuses on the behaviour of the poor rather than 
4 
the structure of the whole society’; and ‘[i]t is a gendered discourse, about idle, 
criminal young men and single mothers’ (see especially Tyler 2008 on this final 
point). 
3. Discourse on ‘chavs’, at least in public, is generally ‘light-hearted’ and ironic. 
Television characters most often identified as ‘chavs’ are comedy sketch characters, 
such as Vicky Pollard from Little Britain (BBC 2003-2006) and the ‘chav pilots’ from 
The Armstong and Miller Show (BBC 2007-2010). It has given rise to ‘humour’ books 
such as The Little Book of Chavs, The Little Book of Chavspeak, The Little Book of 
Chav Jokes, The Chav Guide to Life (Bok, 2004a; 2004b; 2006a, 2006b) and Chav! 
A User’s Guide to Britain’s New Ruling Class (Wallace and Spanner, 2004), and a 
popular series of teenage novels, Diary of a Chav (Dent, 2007a; 2007b; 2007c). As 
part of a larger research project into uses of the word between 2004 and 2008, I 
collected a corpus of over two hundred newspaper articles using the word. None of 
these articles could be seen as a traditional serious or ‘hard’ news story. Much more 
typical were weekend personal columns, television reviews, magazine features and 
similar light-hearted ‘soft’ items.   
It is the conjunction points two and three that is most significant to this paper. Discourse on 
‘chavs’ belongs to a long-running tendency towards the stereotyping of the poor in British 
society. The kinds of things that are said about ‘chavs’, even when not as extreme as the 
jokes presented in the introduction of this paper, are close to those said about the 
‘underclass’, or about people considered ‘common’. And yet, it all seems to be so thoroughly 
ironic.  
3 Blank irony 
I take irony to be a phenomenon whereby something is said or written in such a way as to 
self-consciously invite scepticism about whether what has been said or written is really what 
is meant. It is a kind of semiotic practice which seems to say without sincerely meaning, or 
which at least raises doubts about sincerity. This is clearly not the only way in which irony 
could be understood (see e.g. Muecke 1982, 8-13). It is a conception of irony that Colebrook 
calls ‘modern irony’. Something seems to be being said, but in such a way as to raise doubts 
about whether the speaker (or the writer) really means to assert what they say. Such irony 
raises, but does not answer, the question; ‘Is what is said what is meant?’ (2000, 21). To 
look back to the ‘chav’ jokes that I presented in my introduction above, the writers of The 
Little Book of Chav Jokes do not really mean that ‘chavs’ should give up breathing for lent, 
or at least the fact that it is an ironic joke means that to ‘get it’ is to act as if they don’t. But 
equally, what what such irony does not do is to actively express the opposite of the ‘literal’ 
meaning of what is said (c.f. Grice 1975): We are unlikely to think that the ‘chav’ joke writer 
means that it is particularly important for ‘chavs’ to carry on breathing.  
It is well established that irony is more than just saying one thing and meaning the opposite 
(Sperber and Wilson 1981). It involves what we might see as degrees of detachment. On 
one end of the scale we might have the situation of classic sarcastic irony, whereby 
something is said to mean the opposite. As listeners, readers or analysts, in such cases, we 
can be fairly sure that the person does not mean what they say, that they are not being 
sincere in what is said. In fact we might think them pretty sincere in meaning the opposite. 
Somewhere slightly closer to sincere, non-ironic discourse, we have the situation of what we 
might call satiric irony. In such cases, again, we can be fairly sure that the speaker does not 
mean what they say. There is a clear critical evaluation of what is ‘literally’ said. It is 
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parodied, made fun of, negatively evaluated. But, we can be less sure about what – 
positively – the speaker does mean. Colebrook’s ‘modern irony’ is less detached again than 
satire. It is blank irony as famously described by Jameson (1998: 5). This is a ‘neutral’ ironic 
practice. Ironic, but without ‘the satirical impulse’. What is being said is perhaps not meant – 
we can’t be sure – but neither is it actively criticised. It is this final kind of irony that is most 
relevant to discourse on ‘chavs’, and which causes the kinds of problems for critique that I 
outlined in the introduction above.  
For Colebrook and Jameson, blank irony is not simply a pragmatic behaviour, or a kind of 
speech act. It is not just a thing that people sometimes do with language which needs 
explanation within a relatively decontextualised account of language itself (see Farrow 1998 
for a critical review of such attempts by linguists). For these writers, irony is a cultural 
phenomenon, something that happens in a particular time period, among people who live 
particular kinds of lives. Linda Hutcheon calls it a ‘discursive practice’ (1994). Jameson’s 
account of this ‘blank irony’ is also a ‘critical’ one in the (restricted) sense that it connects a 
semiotic practice – blank irony – to broader social and economic changes (Fairclough 1995, 
Ch1). In his classic account of postmodern culture,iv ‘blank irony’ is related to a situation in 
which society fragments, such that all ways of using language come to look contingent and 
the idea of a ‘normal’, truthful form of representation appears to be an impossibility. This is a 
kind of Tower of Babel account of the fragmentation of ways of talking in the last hundred 
years or so, whereby Discourses, Styles, Genres become relativized, all seen as equally ‘fair 
game’ for ironic appropriation; ‘the very possibility of any linguistic norm in terms of which 
one could ridicule private languages and idiosyncratic styles would vanish’ (1998, 5) 
So Jameson relates blank irony to its cultural context, but his critical perspective is less 
forceful in normative terms. He tells us that such blank irony exists, that it can be understood 
in terms of broader societal tendencies, but he has little to say about why it matters in a 
normative sense. Why should we care? How does such irony actually affect people’s lives? 
Perhaps the clearest voice on this question is the author David Foster Wallace, who also 
sees irony in cultural-temporal terms, but with a clear sense of what it feels like to live with 
blank irony. Writing about the United States in the early 1990s, ‘irony tyrannizes us’, he tell 
us, since it is ‘impossible to pin down’. ‘[T]oday’s irony ends up saying’: 
“How very banal to ask what I mean.” Anyone with the heretical gall to ask an ironist 
what he actually stands for ends up looking like a hysteric or a prig. And therein lies 
the oppressiveness of institutionalized irony …: the ability to interdict the question 
without attending to its content is tyranny 
Foster Wallace 1993, 184 
For Foster Wallace, the oppression of irony resides in its evasiveness. Implicit in his account 
is a kind of Aristotelian or Habermasian argument that to live healthy public lives, we need to 
be able to say what we mean about the world, and we need to be able to recognise other 
people as saying things – and actually meaning them – too. The absolute fragmentation that 
Jameson outlines and which becomes ‘Institutionalised irony’, as Foster Wallace puts it, 
threatens this. It ignores ‘content’, and in so doing it undermines the public and political 
significance of that old-fashioned representational function of language.  
The discussion above might look like a needlessly abstract lead-in to an account of irony in 
‘chav’ humour. Terry Eagleton writes that frameworks of discourse analysis are guilty of 
‘sometimes solemnly labouring the obvious, wheeling up the big guns of linguistic analysis to 
despatch the inconsiderable gnat of a dirty joke’ (1991, 196). And perhaps he is right. But 
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Foster Wallace’s arguments, in particular, articulate well the difficulty that we face in 
developing a critical account of ‘chav’ humour. We can’t simply dismiss them as ‘dirty jokes’ 
partly because they seem to be symptomatic of the kind of blank irony that Foster Wallace 
finds so problematic and so pervasive, and partly because, as researchers interested in 
representation, we have yet to work out how to deal with the meaning of ‘dirty jokes’ in any 
case. How do we deal with this – very public – saying without (necessarily) meaning? 
4 Semiotics of blank irony 
What I intend to do now is to establish some of the semiotic clues that the kind of irony 
outlined above actually does exist in discourse about ‘chavs’. I do so with reference to a 
collection of texts about ‘chavs’ taken from the list of ‘chav’ humour books outlined above. 
One point that needs making at the outset of this section is that there can be no definitive 
‘sign’ or set of signs that categorically index irony. This is a point made by Colebrook (2000), 
following Davidson’s comments on the impossibility of a sign for sincerity (1984). Irony relies 
on the existence of uncertainty about a language user’s sincerity. The consequence of this 
for a semiotic account of irony is that any attempt to provide a definitive list of the resources 
of irony would be misguided. It would be a mistake to assume that we could identify a more 
categorical list of clues to irony than is available to people involved in actual ironic 
communication.  
On the other hand, though, it might sometimes be useful to language users to index, with 
varying degrees of explicitness, their ironic intentions, and, in such cases, we can think 
about what resources they might use to do this. Much linguistic work on irony focuses on 
identifying such resources, and in his classic study of literary irony, Wayne Booth, outlines a 
number of ‘clues to irony’ (1974, 49-75). I will refer to such existing work in my account 
below. What are the semiotic features that indicate to readers that so much discourse on 
‘chavs’ is to be taken as ironic? I suggest that we can usefully attend to the following: 
1. Metasemiotic marking - resources which, with varying degrees of explicitness, 
reflexively ‘mark’  the discourse as ironic 
2. Echoes - self-conscious echoing or mimicry of existing semiotic stereotypes.  
3. Stereotypic unreasonableness - the deployment of a ‘coding orientation’ which 
evades questions of realism or accuracy in being obviously overblown 
4.1 Metasemiotic marking 
Quite obviously, we might sometimes be explicitly told that some text or stretch of discourse 
is ironic (Booth 1974, 53-55).v There is considerable interest in contemporary sociolinguistics 
in the ways in which people reflexively mark their discourse as being of particular kinds 
(Agha 2007; Jaworski et al 2004). The ironic humour of ‘chav’ discourse is metasemiotically 
marked in a number of ways.  
The books are marked by their cartoonish design (on which more below), in some cases by 
their titles (The Little Book of Chav Jokes), and by instructions to stockists such as ‘file under 
humour’. They may also be presented in the ‘humour’ section of book and gift shops. And, 
given the distribution of the word ‘chav’ in public discourse more generally – it might be 
argued that the word itself carries with it a comedic prosody of some kind. When we read the 
word ‘chav’, we are unlikely to think that we are in for any kind of ‘serious’ discourse. 
Further, not all ironic discourse about ‘chavs’ comes in identifiable ‘jokes’ of the kind 
presented in the introduction. But where they do, we might also see this joke form itself as a 
kind of metasemiotic marking. This is roughly how it was understood by Freud (2002). Freud 
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thought that the generic semiotic form of the joke was simply a kind of trigger which let us 
know that we can ‘let go’. We do not find the clever wordplay funny in itself, but it does 
nonetheless work as a trigger to tell us that it is ok to laugh, to forget our inhibitions. These 
inhibitions, he thought, might be psychological or they might be social. We might feel that 
there exists some social authority that prevents us from expressing some feeling or point of 
view. The joke form allows us to put this authority to one side. Freud would not put it exactly 
like this, but it is a kind of metasemiotic indicator that it is acceptable to laugh at the 
unacceptable, to not take what is ‘said’ seriously.  
As an example, take the following jokes from The Little Book of Chav Jokes (Bok 2006a): 
(4) What do you call it when a chavette has an abortion? 
Crime prevention 
(5) Where does a chavette go to lose weight? 
The abortion clinic. 
What is being said here - if we take things literally - is clearly unacceptable. In (5), there is a 
fairly extreme case of the gendering of ‘chav’ discourse – ‘chavettes’ are good at having 
babies, but they don’t much care about them.vi However, the joke form acts as a clue that we 
are not to take things seriously.  
Importantly, thought, the metasemiotic marking associated with ‘chav’ discourse does not 
show signs of reflexive critique. That is, though we are likely to read these jokes as being 
ironic, we are unlikely to see them as satirising or criticising what is literally said.  
4.2 Echoes 
We recognise irony, Sperber and Wilson suggest, when we see some discourse as an 
‘echoic mention’ of existing discourse (1981). Rather than ‘using’ language to say something 
about the world, ironists are just ‘mentioning’ the language, echoing things already said. This 
is why, Sperber and Wilson suggest, so much irony makes use of stereotypical expressions 
or recognisable norms (1981: 312). These things are easy to ‘echo’ and are easily 
recognised as ‘echoic’. There are problems with the point of view as an account of all irony 
certainly (see Toolan 1996: 207-220), and it has to be acknowledged that, even where we 
do see a relationship between echoic mention and irony, we might just as easily identify the 
existence of echoic mention on the basis of ironic insincerity in the first place, rather than the 
other way round. But, nonetheless, there does seem to be such a relationship between at 
least some irony and the echoing of other voices. And, specifically in discourse on ‘chavs’ 
this is often the case. 
First, there is an echoing of established genres, such as the dictionary (e.g. The Little Book 
of Chavspeak, Bok 2004b) and the I-Spy Guide (e.g. ‘Chav Spotting’ in Chav! A User’s 
Guide, Wallace and Spanner 2004). Second, there is an echoing of the supposed ‘voice’, or 
at least point of view, of ‘chavs’ themselves, for example in the Chav Prayer, a chav’s-eye 
pastiche of the Lord’s prayer which begins, ‘Our Giro who art in Job Centre…’ (Bok 2006b). 
But it is a third kind of echoing that is most critically problematic. This is the echoing of class 
stereotypes themselves. Writers on ‘chavs’ echo existing stereotypic representations of the 
language, tastes, behaviour of working class people. I have suggested elsewhere that the 
specifically linguistic stereotype of ‘chavspeak’ is echoic in this sense (Author 2012). 
Extremely well-established sociolinguistic stereotypes, such as ‘H-dropping’, are deployed in 
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stylisations of ‘chavspeak’. What matters about these forms is not that they have any 
particular relationship to actually-existing talk, but that they are recognisable class 
stereotypes. They echo stereotypes that we already know, and are well used to. 
(6) ‘ave 
Verb 
Chav speak contraction of the English ‘have’.  
Bok 2004b 
The same could be said of the discourse itself which represents ‘chavs’. Nothing new is 
being said. And I suggest that this is not simply a reflection of a continuing strand of class 
prejudice in British social life, but also a blankly ironic echoing of these stereotypes. The 
following, to give one example, is a list of ‘chav likes’ from The Chav Guide to Life (Bok 
2006b: 99). It is difficult to see this as anything other than a list of well-established, 
recognised stereotypes to do with the supposed criminality and hedonism of the 
‘undeserving’ poor: 
(7) Maccy D’s, Drinking, Clubbing, Shagging, Smashing Phone Boxes, Drugs, 
Smoking, Racing Novas, Joyriding, Getting stoned, Spitting, Lying, Acting hard 
To be clear, my argument here is that a key part of what is being echoed or stylised here are 
existing stereotypic representations. They are not being critically echoed, or satirised, but 
blankly reproduced. This echoing is not simply pastiche of what critical discourse analysts 
would call Style, but also of Discourse (see e.g. Fairclough 2003). That is, it is not only forms 
of presentation or identification that are knowingly recycled, but also ways of representing. 
‘Chav’ discourse is an ironic recycling of ways of talking about the social world. 
4.3 Stereotypic unreasonableness 
Discourse about ‘chavs’ is also characterised by an obviously unreasonable degree of 
certainty about what ‘chavs’ are like and how they behave (see Toolan 1996: 215 on 
unreasonableness as a clue to irony). This is clearest to see in the cartoonish images of 
‘chavs’ that are used on the covers and inside ‘chav’ humour books. Such cartoonish images 
make use of a ‘coding orientation’ (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006, 163-166) by which 
viewers are invited to think about the images as stereotyped abstractions rather than as 
nuanced, naturalistic images. Their decontextualisation and their bright, unmodulated 
colours and simple lines tell us to treat these as cartoonish stereotypes, rather than as the 
kinds of image about which we can ask questions of literal truth or accuracy. And the same 
can be said of the language used to write about ‘chavs’. It is a language which foregrounds 
its own certainty about the nature of the ‘chav’, largely through the use of indicators of high 
epistemic modality. Such resources include adverbs indicating usuality, as in the following 
example (from Wallace and Spanner’s 2004 Chav!, as are examples 9-13): 
(8) there is always at least one fight on the [wedding] day and it usually involves a 
drunken brawl between the male members of the bride’s family versus those from the 
groom’s family. Or, if the bride and groom are from the same family, which is often 
the case, old family grievances are aired, usually resulting in one almighty punch-up! 
And descriptions of ‘chav’ behaviour in a rule-like manner using conditional subordinate 
clauses: 
(9) If a chav is indoors then the TV is going to be on. 
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(11) If a chav should ever miss an episode of [Eastenders], they must promise to 
‘watch it on Sunday’ or will be forever banished from the chav community. 
(12) If a Chav can get by on the dole, s/he will. 
On occasion, anaphoric nouns are used that refer back to earlier formulations of ‘chav’ 
behaviour as ‘rule[s]’: 
(13) Kebab shop owners are usually in the front line for this kind of treatment in the 
post-pub world and will usually suffer if England has been beaten. The exception to 
this rule is if the chav happens to live in a multicultural community, in which case they 
are likely to be confronted by a lot of non-Brits who are much bigger than they are. 
Such resources suggest a predictability to chav behaviour, that readers can know with some 
certainty what ‘chavs’ will do. But there is a point about this modality worth considering. 
Clauses with such explicit markers of epistemic modality as identified here might be 
understood as less epistemically certain than clauses without any markers at all. A ‘bare’ 
declarative is read as certain, and to add any markers of modality to this, however strong, 
might be to raise the question of how certain we are that this is true (Lyons 1977, 808-9). 
Following this analysis, the use of such resources is likely to diminish the sense of certainty 
about ‘chav’ behaviour, not strengthen it. However, rather than jeopardising my argument, I 
think that this in fact leads to a more subtle understanding of the use of markers of epistemic 
modality. This discourse is not oriented towards truth itself but towards stereotyping, and it 
seems likely that this is what these markers serve to indicate – they serve to say both ‘these 
are very predictable people that we are describing’ and also ‘we are being stereotypical 
about them’. In this sense then, they are markers of a meta-modality; not of how certain we 
should be about these facts, but of how certain the authors wish to appear to be about them. 
They are, then, indicators of reflexive awareness of stereotyping as much as they are 
indicators of stereotyping itself.  
The cartoonish abstraction is not only a knowing exaggeration of stereotypes of ‘chavs’, but 
of the text producers’ own attitudes towards ‘chavs’. Take for example, this joke: 
(14) Two chavs jump off a cliff: who hits the ground first? 
Who cares? 
Bok 2006a: 35 
Here it is at least in part the sheer unreasonableness of not caring about another human 
being ‘hit[ting] the ground’ that indicates irony. Not the unreasonable certainty about ‘chav’ 
behaviour, but the unreasonable callousness. A similar unreasonableness is striking in the 
above abortion-related jokes (4, 5), or in the outrageous misogyny of a joke like: 
 (15) How do you stop a chavette from smoking? 
 Slow down and use a lubricant. 
 Bok 2006a: 109 
In this joke - and many others like it - there is a clearly gendered representation of the 
‘chavette’ as a sexual object. This is nothing new in stereotypic representations of working 
class women. To ‘get’ the joke we have to recognise that the reason the ‘chavette’ is 
smoking is because someone - ‘you’ - is having violent sex with her. But with the extremity of 
this indicates that it is (probably) not to be taken seriously.   
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What allows all of this stereotypic unreasonableness to contribute to blank irony, rather than 
acting as satiric irony is, I think, the fact that there is nothing anywhere else in discourse on 
‘chavs’ to contradict these unreasonable claims. Incongruities with things said elsewhere or 
the kinds of ‘conflicts’ or ‘clashes’ that Booth discusses (1974) simply do not arise. In the 
case of Chav! A User’s Guide, we even find an ‘About the Authors’ section in which we are 
told that one of the authors ‘connects’ with Sigourney Weaver in the film Aliens ‘as he tries to 
locate the queen chav’s nest so that he can get rid of her eggs and call her a bitch’ (2006, 
256). A consequence of this lack of satiric intention is that though it is clear that to ‘get’ these 
‘chav’ humour books is to engage with them ironically, and that this might involve some 
scepticism about sincerity, it is also clear that this is not the same as categorically not 
meaning what is said.vii  
5 Critique of blank irony 
In the above I have sought to describe what the irony in discourse on ‘chavs’ looks like. I 
now want to discuss what a critical response to this might be. This returns us to the problem 
posed in the introduction. What kind of useful critical intervention can be made of a semiotic 
practice that critiques itself, and which seems – though we can’t be sure – to know that it is 
repeating objectionable stereotypes without care?  
5.1 Give up 
I have suggested that we cannot take the irony of ‘chav’ discourse to imply that its producers 
actually do not mean what they say. But we can take it as casting doubt upon sincerity, and 
as evading the kinds of language games associated with ‘sincere’ communication. Indeed, 
for Michael Billig (2001), the function of racist jokes as used by the Ku Klux Klan is not to say 
things that the Klan members do not mean – they are explicitly and avowedly racist people – 
but to say things that they (probably) do mean, while at the same time ‘mocking restraints’ 
on doing so. If this is also the case with the ‘chav’ jokes, and with such objectionable irony 
more generally, then perhaps the first critical strategy that we should consider is simply 
giving up. That is, if we really do think that the producers of the ‘chav’ jokes mean what they 
are saying, and yet don’t care, we might have to admit, however important we think it is to 
take a critical approach to communication, that there are more useful places to expend our 
efforts. These people, we might reasonable think, are beyond the pale. Indeed, it is a point 
worth recognising in general that pointing out to someone that their discourse is 
stereotypical, ‘classist’, sexist or otherwise ideological is not necessarily going to give them 
any reason to stop saying what they say. It might very well be the case that rather than 
having an ideological point of view work through them and implicitly structuring their 
representations of the world, they have actually found a point of view that they like, and are 
committing to it. They want to be sexist. In which case, it is likely to be of little use to point to 
the sexism in their discourse.  
But if this leads us to give up on critique, then it does so only under the assumption that the 
people to whom our critique is addressed are the producers of the discourse itself. Perhaps 
our critique is also useful as a kind of ‘consciousness-raising’viii exercise for those who are 
not so thoroughly committed to the ideologies that we identify – people such as ourselves, 
our colleagues, our students, most members of that thing ‘the general public’. I think that this 
is the case, and for this reason, would hesitate to suggest giving up on critique. But I also 
think that we do face closely related questions that are particularly felt in the critique of irony, 
but have much more general applications for critical researchers: (1) we probably need to 
think much more about who the audience of our critical work is – who are we writing our 
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critiques for and why? And (2) we also have to recognise that a lot of the critique that we 
engage in is already going on ‘out there’ (Jones 2007) – very few people who I have read 
these ‘chav’ jokes to have found them funny. And I do not think that it is just down to my 
delivery. I am not sure what the answer to these questions is, and think that thinking them 
through may be of some benefit in a great deal of critical research. 
5.2 Ignore the irony – take the Discourse literally 
Another possibility is that we simply ignore the irony, and view such discourse as 
straightforwardly assertive. We could just act as if the ‘chav’ jokers really do mean what they 
say and respond by playing the established language games of critique. This would mean 
asking questions of representation, and perhaps especially – though not all critical 
researchers would agree with this – of truth. It was precisely this kind of earnest attachment 
to assertion that David Foster Wallace thought might be typical of a new generation of post-
ironic critical writers. These, Foster Wallace thought, would be ‘some weird bunch of “anti-
rebels”’: 
These anti-rebels would be outdated, of course, before they even started. Too 
sincere. Clearly repressed. Backward, quaint, naïve, anachronistic. … The new 
rebels might the ones willing to risk the yawn, the rolled eyes, the cool smile, the 
nudged ribs, the parody of gifted ironists, the “How banal”.  
Foster Wallace 1993: 192-3 
In a sense, what Foster Wallace is advocating here is similar to the established critical 
method of ‘defamiliarisation’, a practice that always involved a kind of forced naivety, an 
acting as you don’t know what’s going on (when really you do). But, rather than 
defamiliarising ourselves from straightforward ‘common sense’, we would be defamiliarising 
ourselves from the ironic practice of detachment itself. Indeed, once we have recognised the 
kind of cynical irony involved in ‘chav’ jokes, it is hard to imagine how we can continue to 
take them at their word in any other way. However, in taking this approach we would clearly 
be adopting a kind of ‘cynical distance’ ourselves. To be one of Foster Wallace’s earnest 
anti-rebels, we have to take an ironic stance on irony itself. I know that you are joking, but I 
am going to act as if you mean it. This may be a useful disarming strategy, perhaps. But I 
am undecided on whether this is not just going to get us into more ironic trouble. To play the 
role of the anti-rebel might be a helpful critical ploy if a friend of ours tells a sexist joke. But it 
is much harder to imagine that we could take such an approach as the base of a school of 
academic critique, let alone any kind of positive political movement.  
5.4 Focus on the Genre 
Another possibility is that we focus on the irony itself, and concern ourselves less with trying 
to work out exactly what the ironists are saying about the world. This involves focusing on 
cynical irony as a Genre, or a kind of semiotic activity, and thinking about what the causes 
and effects of this activity itself might be. Jameson, as outlined in Section 3 above, provides 
an account of the causes, and Foster Wallace of the effects. Both of these writers, I 
suggested, are ‘critical’ in these useful ways. They allow us to see irony as a cultural 
tendency which exists in relation to other aspects of social life, and also to think about how it 
might affect social life. However, it would be misleading to understand this ‘chav’ humour – 
or any other specific ironic practice – only in terms of the more general practice of irony, and 
to ignore what kinds of things are actually being said ironically. The irony matters especially 
here because of what (if we take it literally) it is about. Britain, at the peak of ‘chav’ 
12 
discourse, was a more unequal place than it had been for generations (Stewart and Hills 
2005). Studies were suggesting that it was increasingly geographically segregated along 
economic lines (Dorling et al 2007). The public spaces in which people from different 
backgrounds might interact were being privatised, gentrified and instrumentalised (Minton 
2012). Old forms of gendered class disgust were being felt, and exploited, for example in 
television comedies like Little Britain (Skeggs 2005, Tyler 2008). Class and gender were 
important things to talk about. But they were also very difficult things to talk about. The irony 
itself might be understood – perhaps tentatively – as a response to this, a kind of cynical 
resignation to a world of inequality which changing the ways in which we talk is likely to do 
little about. In such a situation, if there is little hope in talking earnestly or straightforwardly 
about these things, why not repeat stereotypes? Of course, cynical resignation of this kind 
may mean laughing along with the ideologues. 
So, focusing on the ironic practice itself allows us to appreciate the specifics of ironic 
discourse – its ‘cynical detachment’ as Žižek (1989) would have it – but we also need to 
retain some concern for what is being talked about, even if it is precisely the ‘aboutness’ of 
irony which is difficult to grasp. It is important, therefore, that we attend both to what the 
irony is about (the question of Discourse, with the attendant risk that we look ‘banal’) and to 
what the irony does (the question of Genre). The fact that what it does is to make our very 
questions of ‘aboutness’ hard to ask certainly makes this a difficult task. In the long term, this 
requires more thought, more attempts at critique, and perhaps some questioning of 
theoretical categories such as Discourse and Genre themselves. What I hope to have done 
here is to highlight the problem, and some possible ways of dealing with it.  
6 Conclusion 
The significance the kind of ‘cynical detachment’ associated with irony is certainly not news 
to critical theory taken generally. We can see this in the 1980s writings of Rorty, Jameson or 
Žižek. But critical approaches to linguistics, discourse analysis and semiotics have so far 
had little to say on the matter. This is particularly problematic because those working in 
these fields are likely to confront ironic practices fairly regularly, and yet are likely to find little 
in the way of theoretical support when they do. Against this background, the aim of this 
paper has been to specify the problems that blank irony in particular causes for critical 
approaches to communication, to provide a case study of a kind of discourse in which it 
seems to exist, and to suggest, fairly tentatively, some ways in which we might face up to 
this problem. My intention has been to cast these final suggestions in ways which leave 
them fairly open in two senses: first, in that I hope they are open for further discussion and 
critique; and second, in that I hope that they are open enough to be applicable to ironic 
practices well beyond ‘chav’ discourse itself.  
 
As a final plea for generalizability, many of the issues discussed here touch on quite 
fundamental theoretical issues in critical approaches to communication. Such issues include 
the distinction between Discourse and Genre, the question of whether and how it matters if 
people ‘mean what they say’, and the question of who we are writing our critiques for. These 
are difficult issues not only in the case of irony, but also in relation to cynical tendencies in 
other fields of life such as advertising and political communication. Thinking about irony, I 
would suggest, is therefore a useful way of reflecting on some of the implicit conceptions of 
language and communication that we adopt in our critical analyses, precisely because it 
raises problems of the kind discussed in this paper. 
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i Throughout this paper, I use the word ‘chav’ with ‘scare-quotes’. This is to indicate that I do 
not take there to be any real world thing called a ‘chav’. The ‘chav’ is a stereotype.  
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ii A distinction that I will not really address is that between humorous forms of irony and other 
forms of irony. There are certainly distinctions to be drawn there, but the focus of this paper 
will be on forms of irony that are also intended to be humorous. Conversely, probably not all 
humour is ironic in the sense in which I am using the term. But there is a significant enough 
overlap between irony and humour for it to be worth thinking about this ironic humour.  
 
iii I am often asked whether ‘chav’ has not been reappropriated in the way that some other 
negative stereotype labels have been. I see little evidence that it has. There were certainly 
some attempts at this, such as the British tabloid newspaper The Sun running a ‘Proud to be 
a Chav’ campaign in late 2004 (following a spike in media attention when the word was 
named OUP’s ‘word of the year’). The campaign, as far as I can tell, was unsuccessful. It 
ended within a week, and The Sun’s use of the ‘chav’ was certainly never so celebratory 
again. In all, I would say that, while there were some attempts here and there at 
reappropriation, it would be very hard to make the case that ‘chav’ has undergone the 
standard reappropriation process. 
 
iv Some may have noticed that while Colebrook calls such irony ‘modern irony’, Jameson 
seems to identify it with postmodernism. Actually, Jameson’s identification is slightly more 
ambivalent than this. ‘Pastiche’ a particular kind of blank irony is typical of postmodernity, 
but blank irony itself is a modern phenomenon. Further discussion of exactly what conditions 
such irony is typical of, and it historical genealogy would be fascinating, but such issues 
cannot be explored here in any depth.  
 
v As Booth points out, though, there is always the possibility that such ‘straightforward 
warnings in the author’s own voice’ are themselves ironic, and not to be taken literally. 
 
vi There are clearly also here normative presuppositions about the significance of abortion 
itself. Note also here the morphology of ‘chavette’, which works in some discourse on ‘chavs’ 
(but not all) to distinguish the ostensible characteristics of the female ‘chav(ette)’ - 
promiscuity, ugliness, bad parenting - from those of the male ‘chav’ - violence, drug use, 
criminality. This gender distinction is well-established in discourse on the ‘underclass’ and 
‘undeserving poor’. 
 
vii I once gave a talk to a group of British Sixth Formers about representations of ‘chavs’. 
After showing some cartoon drawings, I said ‘… but real life is not like a cartoon’. To which 
one of the students shouted back ‘yes it is’. Laughs all round. Undoubtedly, there are layers 
of irony in the student’s comment itself. But it raises an important point to which I will return, 
which is that irony is not a categorical, all or nothing phenomenon. There is always the 
possibility that the ironist also means it.  
 
viii This of course makes the entirely contingent assumption that people need their 
consciousness raised when it comes to this kind of thing. I think that the success of shows 
like Little Britain suggests that some people do, even if few are likely to find the more violent 
‘chav’ jokes funny. But this is nonetheless a contingent assumption, and the questions of 
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who our critiques are for and what role they play in broader political contests are very real 
ones. 
